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Abstract: Abstract: Abstract: Abstract:  The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  investigate  the  relationship  between  laws 
strengthening women’s rights, and children’s outcomes, namely child labor and educational 
attainment. We analyze the effects of a land reform introduced in Vietnam in 2003 that had 
the objective of reinforcing women’s land rights within households. The introduction of the 
2003 Land Law represents a quasi-natural experiment which allows us to analyze how legal 
reforms are transformed and adopted by social norms. We investigate the effects of being 
part of the population of households targeted by the land law with the help of a household 
survey that permits detailed investigation of property rights at the plot level. We show that 
the  land  reform  contributed  to  reducing  girls’  participation  in  household  agricultural 
production  and  to  increasing  girls’  educational  attainment.  We  do  not  find  comparable 
effects for boys.  
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1.  1.  1.  1. Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction       
Gender  equality,  female  empowerment  and  the  elimination  of  child  labor  are 
fundamental elements of economic development, as set out in the Millennium Development 
Goals (United Nations 2009). According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), 
about 215 million children between the ages of 5 and 17 are engaged in child labor around 
the  world.  Approximately  two  thirds  of  child  workers  are  unpaid  family  laborers,  while 
agriculture  represents  the  largest  sector  employing  approximately  60%  of  the  child 
workforce. Girls in particular face the burden of being involved both in child labor and in 
domestic work, which often is not accounted for in official statistics (International Labour 
Organization 1999, 2010). 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between laws intending to 
strengthen  women’s  rights,  and  children’s  outcomes,  namely  child  labor  and  educational 
attainment. To this end, we analyze the effects of a land reform which was introduced in 
Vietnam in 2003 with the aim of reinforcing women’s land rights within the household (UN 
Volunteers 2004). We provide evidence that the land reform contributed to reducing girls’ 
child  labor  and  to  increasing  girls’  educational  attainment.  Several  features  make  our 
findings particularly interesting. First, no change regarding inheritance and separation of 
assets in case of divorce is brought about by the land law, which is simply restating existing 
rights. Second, we study the effect of being de jure subject to the 2003 Land Law without de 
facto implementing it at the household level. Therefore, our findings are likely to reflect a 
change  in  customs  and  social  norms  driven  by  formal  institutions  towards  more  gender 
equality. 
Following  the  land  decollectivization introduced  by  the  Doi  Moi
1  reform  program 
towards  the  end  of  the  1980s,  the  1993  Land  Law  launched  the  issuance  of  land  use 
certificates (LUC), which assigned land use rights on households’ land holdings. According to 
the 1993 Land Law, a LUC is (re)issued every time an additional plot is registered with the 
local government. Until 2003 land use certificates usually reported the name of the household 
head only. In the case of married couples, the husband’s name was customarily reported. In 
compliance with the recent Vietnamese 2003 Land Law, land use certificates must report the 
names of both spouses in the case of jointly owned plots and if the LUC is (re)issued after 
2003 (The National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam 2003).  
The 2003 Land Law constitutes a change of form rather than substance: the law does 
not affect issues such as inheritance and land allocation in the case of divorce. Both spouses 
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were entitled to equal land rights of jointly owned plots, regardless of whether one or both 
names were reported on the land use certificate, even before the introduction of the 2003 
Land Law.  
The 2003 Land Law, by reinforcing women’s rights to land holdings, represents a 
unique  quasi-natural  experiment,  which  allows  us  to  analyze  how  legal  reforms  are 
transformed and adopted by custom and social norms. If women have preferences for girls or 
wish  to  mitigate  existing  gender  inequalities  favoring  boys,  increased  female  bargaining 
power within the household would be reflected in lower intensities of child labor and higher 
educational attainment among girls.  
Given  possible  endogeneity  in  the  implementation  of  the  2003  Land  Law  at  the 
household  level,  we  exploit  the  introduction  of  the  land  law  rather  than  its  actual 
implementation. This means that we investigate the effect of being part of the population 
that is subject to the land law, irrespective of whether or not the law is implemented at the 
household level, as opposed to not being part of the target population of the law. By using a 
unique household data set that allows thorough inspection of the ownership of land rights at 
the individual plot level, we show that reinforcing existing land rights of female spouses has 
positive effects on girls’ outcomes. It reduces their likelihood of participating in household 
agricultural production and increases their educational attainment. We argue that the lack 
of findings for boys partly reflects a move towards mitigating the differences in outcomes 
between girls and boys and therefore a move towards more gender equality, and may partly 
also mirror women’s preference for girls. A series of robustness checks gives us confidence in 
our findings. We disentangle the effects of possible concurrent driving factors such as single 
ownership by one spouse only, plot registration, and land acquisition from the impact of the 
2003 Land Law on child labor and children’s educational attainment.  
Child  labor  in  Vietnam  has  declined  substantially  since  the  1990s.  Edmonds  and 
Pavcnik (2005) demonstrate that an increase in the real price of rice associated with trade 
liberalization can account for almost half of the reduction in child labor in Vietnam in the 
1990s. However, significant heterogeneity in child work rates is still observed. Edmonds and 
Turk (2002) provide evidence that the decrease in child workers has been the smallest in 
urban areas, the Central Highlands and the South Central coast. Moreover, girls are found 
to be more likely to work in the household and in the family’s businesses and their work 
rates have declined to a smaller extent than those of boys during the 1990s. The authors 
attribute the difference in work rates between boys and girls to different levels of decision-
making power within the household and to the gender division of labor.  4 
 
In  many  developing  countries,  and  especially  in  Asia,  besides  the  differences  in 
workloads, investment in children’s education often exhibits a gender bias, with girls being 
at a disadvantage. Primary school enrollment rates are high considering Vietnam’s level of 
GDP per capita due to the introduction of regulations in the Vietnamese Constitution in 
1992, which made primary education mandatory and free of tuition fees. Primary school 
enrollment rates have increased from 69% in 1994-95 to 96% in 2006-07 according to a report 
by UNICEF (2010). However, other costs associated with children’s education still occur, e.g. 
the  cost  of  books,  pens  and  clothing.  In  situations  of  financial  distress,  these  and  the 
opportunity cost of education often lead to the withdrawal of children from school (World 
Bank 1999). Our analysis focuses on the effects of the land reform on educational attainment 
of children above primary school age. 
The general notion that women in low-income countries often have a lower share of 
power in household decision-making than women in developed countries
  (Pitt and Khandker 
1998) also holds in Vietnam, according to a report by the World Bank (1999). In all of the 
four provinces investigated by the World Bank, different levels of decision-making power 
within the household are reported over issues like the allocation of resources, workloads and 
reproductive decisions and reflect gender inequality.
2  
Our study is related to the literature documenting that the gender of the income 
recipient matter for children’s outcomes.  Pitt and Khandker (1998) test for differences in 
the  effects  of  parental  participation  in  micro  credit  programs  on  children’s  schooling  in 
Bangladesh.  Mothers’  participation  is  found  to  have  robust  positive  effects  on  children’s 
schooling rates, both for sons and daughters with differences depending on the type of credit 
program. In her seminal paper, Duflo (2003) investigates the relationship between an old-age 
social pension program and the health status of children living with an eligible recipient. The 
author finds a positive effect of the pension on girls and no effect on boys living with female 
pension receivers. No effect is found for children living with male pension receivers. Qian 
(2008) investigates the effects of increases in sex-specific income on children: a rise in female 
income, while keeping male income constant, lowers child mortality among daughters and 
has positive effects on educational measures for all children. On the other hand, an increase 
in  male  income,  while  keeping  female  income  constant,  raises  child  mortality  among 
daughters and worsens their educational attainment, with no effect on boys. In a recent 
paper, Brulé (2010) finds that a law equalizing inheritance rights for men and women led to 
increases in perceived land ownership and in self-reported bargaining power of women in 
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India. We depart from Brulé’s findings to show that laws reaffirming women’s rights on land 
holdings, by increasing female bargaining power within the household, have an impact on 
children’s outcomes.  
Furthermore, our study contributes to the emerging literature on the relationship 
between formal and informal institutions as it aims to enhance the understanding of how 
legal reforms are transformed and adopted by custom and social norms. Aldashev et al. 
(2010)  study  how  a  formal law implemented  by  the  state  can  “[…]  defend  the  rights  of 
disadvantaged  groups  when  customary  norms  favor  the  interests  of  traditional  elites[…]” 
(Aldashev et al. 2010, p. 5). Using a model of legal dualism, the authors show how the 
formal law can act as a ‘magnet’ in shaping customary norms and protect minorities or 
marginal groups. This is indeed the case with the Vietnamese 2003 Land Law. First, the law 
did not actually change the spouses’ statutory rights in terms of inheritance or in the case of 
divorce.  Second,  land  law  implementation  was  delayed  by  local  officials.  According  to 
anecdotal evidence “[t]he all-important local officials who administer and interpret the law 
often revert to age-old traditions and customary practices, which favor men, and thus failed 
to deliver on the law’s promises”
 (UN Volunteers 2004, p. 1). Notwithstanding the delays in 
the law’s application, the introduction of the 2003 Land Law is found to have a positive 
impact on girls’ outcomes. The 2003 Land Law therefore appears to act as an application of 
the legal dualism discussed by Aldashev et al. (2010): on one hand, the formal institution 
reaffirms women’s rights on land; on the other, customary practices are ultimately shaped by 
the law itself.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background 
information regarding legal aspects of Vietnam’s land law system. Section 3 discusses the 
household survey data employed in the analysis. Section 4 introduces the estimation strategy 
and presents the main results. Section 5 explores the robustness checks, while Section 6 
concludes.  
2. Land  2. Land  2. Land  2. Land r r r reforms in Vietnam eforms in Vietnam eforms in Vietnam eforms in Vietnam       
In 1988 the Vietnamese government implemented the Doi Moi reform program, the 
first move towards a market economy.
3 Local governments privatized land use rights and 
allocated  the  land,  which  until  1988  had  been  farmed  collectively,  to  households  and 
individuals. Although land allocation was relatively slow, it achieved an equitable assignment 
of land use rights across households, a result supported by Ravallion and van de Walle 
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(2004)  who  do  not  find  any  evidence  of  the  land  allocation  favoring  households  with 
government jobs.  
As a next step in the land reform, the 1993 Land Law prescribed the issuance of land 
use certificates (LUCs), and made land use rights tradable. Although land is still owned by 
the State
4, according to the 1993 Land Law land use rights can be transferred, exchanged, 
inherited and used as collateral.
5 LUCs grant the right to use the assigned plot for 20 years 
in the case of annual crops land and for 50 years in the case of perennial crops land. Local 
authorities allocate the land to households on the basis of the households’ needs, e.g. with 
respect to the number of household members, and issue LUCs that entitle the holders to the 
rights to use the land. However, this right is conditional on compliance with the land law, on 
the individual using it for the designated purpose and in an effective and environmentally 
friendly  fashion  without  harming  adjacent  land  users  (The  National  Assembly  of  The 
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam 2003). Investments in the land in order to cultivate it and 
increase its value are encouraged as implied by the long-term nature of the land use right. 
The 1993 Land Law was indeed perceived as a further commitment by the government to 
secure property rights and it led to an increase in the willingness to undertake long-term 
investments such as investments in irrigation and multi-year crops (Do and Iyer 2008). 
The  issuance  of  LUCs  involves  both  pecuniary  and  non-pecuniary  costs.  Several 
actions of local bureaucracy are necessary in the process of granting land use rights so as to 
determine whether the farmer is eligible to the land and whether the transfer is legal, to 
settle existing disputes over the plot and to issue the actual LUC. In order to have a LUC 
issued, farmers have to pay a fee, which is around VND 20,000 or USD 1.50. However, fee 
exemptions are often granted to boost land registration rates in more remote regions and 
especially in mountainous areas (Do and Iyer 2008). Land may be used as collateral when 
applying for credit and may also be leased out with permission of the authorities. Should the 
LUC holder die, the land use right is transferred to the heirs like an asset; in the absence of 
heirs,  the  state  recovers  the  land.  Recovery  of  land  is  also  permitted  under  special 
circumstances  that  require  expropriation,  for  example  during  a  war  period,  provided  a 
reasonable compensation is granted to the expropriated land user (The National Assembly of 
The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam 2003).  
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5 The LUC gives the right to transfer and rent out the land but not necessarily to determine the 
choice of crops to cultivate on that land (The National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Viet 
Nam 2003). Markussen et al. (2009) find that 52% of the plots in their sample are restricted regarding 
crop choice. 7 
 
According to the 2000 Marriage and Family Law, in the case of divorce, all land 
holdings  that  were  acquired  during  marriage  must  be  divided  equally  between  spouses, 
taking into account the situation and property of each spouse and his/her investment and 
effort on the land and other contributions to family income, where housework has to be 
treated  in  the  same  fashion  as  income-generating  labor  (The  National  Assembly  of  The 
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam 2000).  
Until 2003 land use certificates usually reported the name of the household head 
only, customarily the husband’s name in the case of married couples (UN Volunteers 2004). 
The 2003 Land Law brought about a significant change in the titling of land use certificates. 
Article 48 of the 2003 Land Law explicitly mentions that “[i]n case[s] where the land use 
rights are under joint ownership of the husband and wife, the certificate of such land use 
rights must include full names of the husband and full names of the wife”
 (The National 
Assembly of The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam 2003, p. 29). Practically, the inclusion of 
the spouse’s name on the LUC should automatically happen when the household requires 
having the LUC (re)issued in order to include an additional plot. As of the 2000 Marriage 
and Family Law spouses are officially entitled to equal rights to land holdings, irrespective of 
whether only the household head’s name or both names are stated on the LUC. Ultimately 
the scope of the 2003 Land Law is to reaffirm women’s rights over land holdings, rather than 
altering joint use rights.  
3.  3.  3.  3. Data Data Data Data       
The main source of data employed in this study is the Vietnam Access to Resources 
Household Survey (VARHS), which was conducted in 2006 and 2008 in twelve provinces of 
Vietnam.
6  The  VARHS  was  first  conducted  in  2002  and  initially  covered  four  provinces 
only.
7  The  two  following  rounds  carried  out in 2006  and  2008  extended  the  initial  2002 
sample to 3,269 households in 2008. The purpose of  the VARHS is to gain quantitative 
information on possibilities and constraints of the rural population of Vietnam in accessing 
resources  and  markets.  The  VARHS  contains  general  demographic  characteristics  of 
household  members  and  more  specific  information  on  agricultural  production,  access  to 
markets, and sources of income. In particular, the survey includes extensive information on 
                                                           
6 The Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey was developed in collaboration between the 
Development  Economics  Research  Group  (DERG),  Department  of  Economics,  University  of 
Copenhagen and the Central Institute of Economic Management (CIEM), the Institute for Labour 
Studies and Social Affairs (ILSSA) and the Institute of Policy and Strategy for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (IPSARD), Hanoi, Vietnam. The twelve provinces are: Ha Tay, Nghe An, Khanh Hoa, 
Lam Dong, Dac Lac, Dac Nong, Lao Cai, Dien Bien, Lai Chau, Phu Tho, Quang Nam and Long An 
(Danida 2007). 
7 The four provinces are: Ha Tay, Phu Tho, Quang Nam and Long An (Danida 2007). 8 
 
agricultural  land,  its  acquisition  and  use  rights  at  plot  level,  which  enables  detailed 
investigation of the effects of the 2003 Land Law on children’s outcomes. The 2008 round of 
the survey is the main source of data employed in this investigation, while the 2006 round is 
used for robustness checks.  
The second source of data is the 2004 Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey 
(VHLSS), conducted by the General Statistics Office (GSO). The VHLSS sample overlaps 
with the VARHS sample, thus allowing the construction of a combined data set.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the sample of children between the ages of 6 
and 14 years not living with a single parent as the household head. The current sample is 
used in our assessment of the effects of the 2003 Land Law on child work. We measure child 
labor  in  terms  of  children’s  participation  in  household  production  which  comprises 
agriculture, forestry and aquaculture. This measure is an applicable definition of child work 
for our purposes as household agricultural production is an important source of income in 
the  rural  areas  that  form  our  sample.  The  International  Labour  Organization  rates 
agriculture as one of the three most dangerous sectors for children’s health and safety and 
recognizes agriculture as a priority sector for the elimination of child work (International 
Labour Organization 2006).  
Girls constitute 50% of the sample and a higher share of girls than boys is involved in 
household  production,  although  the  difference  between  boys  and  girls  is  not  statistically 
significant. There is no statistically significant difference between boys and girls regarding 
school enrollment rates, reflecting the regulations in the Vietnamese Constitution in 1992 
which made primary education mandatory. While boys have on average achieved slightly 
more years of education than girls, this difference is not statistically significant either. 9 
 
 
The lower panel of Table 1 shows summary statistics at the household level. The 
average  number  of  children  in  a  household  is  3,  which  is  at  least  in  part  a  result  of 
Vietnam’s history regarding the two-child policy introduced in the late 1980s.
8 In 88% of the 
households  in  this  sample  the  head  of  the  household  is  male  with  an  average  age  of 
approximately 46 years. Given that parents’ education is missing in some cases and that 
Vietnamese  rural  households  generally  span  more  than  two  generations,  we  consider  the 
maximum  number of years  of  education  among  adults  (above  the  age of  18)  within the 
household which exhibits a median value of 9 years of schooling. As we are interested in 
female bargaining power within the household, we control for women’s union membership 
among female household members. Women’s unions play an important role in Vietnamese 
society and, given the low membership fee, participation tends to be relatively widespread. 
About 59% of the households in our sample have at least one member who is active in a 
women’s  union.  On  average  households  hold  5  plots,  which  are  mainly  devoted  to  rice 
cultivation (70%), while the total area of plots varies greatly, from as small as 36 square 
meters to total plot areas as large as 326,000 square meters. About 18% of the households in 
this sample have had a land use certificate (re)issued after 2003, i.e. after the 2003 Land Law 
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location and political involvement of household members (Bélanger et al. 2003). 
Table 1: Summary statistics  Table 1: Summary statistics  Table 1: Summary statistics  Table 1: Summary statistics — — — —       Children 6 Children 6 Children 6 Children 6- - - -14 years of age 14 years of age 14 years of age 14 years of age       
        Full  Full  Full  Full s s s sample ample ample ample        Girls Girls Girls Girls        Boys Boys Boys Boys       
       
Age  10.96  10.99  10.93 
       
School attendance  90.49%  90.1%  90.87% 
       
Years of education  4.57  4.52  4.62 
       
Household production  30.87%  32.04%  29.71% 
       
Observations  1030  515  515 
       
Household  Household  Household  Household 
c c c characteristics haracteristics haracteristics haracteristics       
Mean Mean Mean Mean        Median Median Median Median        Sd Sd Sd Sd       
       
Number of children  3  3  1.37 
       
Age of household head  45.90  42  12.36 
       
Maximum no. of years 
of education among 
adult household 
members 
7.55  9  3.68 
       
Number of plots  5.14  5  3.03 
       
Total area of plots 
(square meters) 
12,374.08  6,540  21,812.61 
       
Value of durables (2008 
VND) 
15,435.08  8300  30,924.46 




9  Approximately  14%  of  the  households  in this  sample  hold  a  LUC  that 
reports the names of both spouses.  
Table 2 reports the corresponding information for the sample of children between the 
ages of 11 and 18 years not attending school at the time of the 2008 survey. We use this 
sample for the assessment of effects of the 2003 Land Law on the duration of education. We 
restrict the sample to children that did not attend school at the time of the survey in order 
to  capture  the  educational  attainment  of  children  that  have  most  likely  finished  their 
education, which reduces the sample size significantly. The sample contains all children that 
fulfill this criterion, are above the age of primary schooling and do not live with a single 
parent as the household head. Boys enjoy on average 0.62 more years of education than girls, 
while a  higher  share  of  girls  is involved in  household  production.  The  great majority  of 
children  in  this  age  group  are  involved  in  household  production  and  neither  of  these 
differences between boys and girls is statistically significant. 
 
 
Summary statistics at the household level for this sample are reported in the lower 
panel of Table 2. The mean number of children is 3.5, while the median is 3 children per 
household.  The  higher  age  of  the  household  head  reflects  the  older  cohort  of  children 
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Land Law is 17.67%. 
Table 2: Summary statistics  Table 2: Summary statistics  Table 2: Summary statistics  Table 2: Summary statistics — — — —       Children 11 Children 11 Children 11 Children 11- - - -18 years of age 18 years of age 18 years of age 18 years of age       
        Full  Full  Full  Full s s s sample ample ample ample        Girls Girls Girls Girls        Boys Boys Boys Boys       
       
Age  16.14  16.14  16.15 
       
Household production  72.02%  72.73%  71.26% 
       
Years of education  6.43  6.13  6.75 
       
Observations  361  187  174 
       
Household  Household  Household  Household 
c c c characteristics haracteristics haracteristics haracteristics       
Mean Mean Mean Mean        Median Median Median Median        Sd Sd Sd Sd       
       
Number of children  3.5  3  1.49 
       
Age of household head  47.43  46  10.13 
       
Maximum no. of years 
of education among 
adult household 
members 
6.9  7  3.78 
       
Number of plots  5.7  5  3.2 
       
Total area of plots 
(square meters) 
12,294.07  7,655  15,328.45 
       
Value of durables (2008 
VND) 
12,312.93  5,867.5  34,302.18 
       
 11 
 
considered  in  this  sample  relative  to  the  one  presented  in  Table  1.  About  7%  of  the 
households are headed by a woman, while women’s union membership is lower than in the 
previous sample: approximately 47% of the households have at least one member who is 
active  in  a  women’s  union.  The  average  number  of  plots  per  household  is  5.7  and  the 
majority  of  plots  are  allocated  to  rice  cultivation  (79%).  Approximately  11%  of  the 
households have registered an additional plot on the land-use certificate after 2003 and 15% 
of the households in the sample hold LUCs that report both spouses’ names.
 10 
 
4.  4.  4.  4. Estimation  Estimation  Estimation  Estimation s s s strategy trategy trategy trategy       
According to the 2003 Land Law, land use certificates should report both names in 
case  the  couple  was  married  before  the  last  plot  was  registered  on  the  LUC  and  if 
registration  occurred  after  2003,  the  year  the  land  law  was  introduced  (The  National 
Assembly of The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam 2003). Approximately one third of eligible 
couples in our samples have the names of both the husband and the wife stated on their 
LUC. We do not find any evidence of a statistically significant relationship between law 
implementation  at  the  household  level  and  observable  household  characteristics  such  as 
ethnicity, employment status of household members and wealth measured by the value of 
durable goods.
11  
The weak implementation of the 2003 Land Law is the foundation of our estimation 
strategy in which we exploit the effects of the introduction of the land law on children living 
in  households  that  are  de  jure  subject  to  the  2003  Land  Law  rather  than  de  facto. 
Households are de jure subject to the land law if the household head is married and if the 
LUC has been (re)issued after 2003 due to the registration of an additional plot. Households 
are de facto subject to the law in the presence of law implementation at the household level, 
i.e. if the household head is married, if the LUC has been (re)issued after 2003 and if it 
states the names of both the household head and his spouse. Given the anecdotal evidence 
reported in the introduction, implementation of the law at the household level is likely to 
have been delayed due to customary rules favoring men. Therefore, households with both 
names on the land use certificate may be characterized by a relatively high degree of female 
empowerment to begin with. In light of Aldashev et al. (2010), we maintain that knowledge 
of being de jure subject to the 2003 Land Law may constitute empowerment by re-assuring 
the spouse in her rights, allowing her bargaining position to increase within the household. 
                                                           
10 The percentage of children living in a household that is that is de jure subject to the 2003 Land 
Law is 10.53% in this sample. 
11 Results are not shown but available from the authors upon request. 12 
 
Due to possible endogeneity of law implementation at the household level not captured by 
observable  characteristics,  the  identification  of  the  effects  of  the  land  law  hinges  on  a 
comparison of the effects of plot registration before and after 2003 on children’s outcomes, 
irrespective of whether or not the LUC bears both names.  
It  is  worth  noting  that  we  do  not  find  any  evidence  of  a  statistically  significant 
relationship between plot registration after 2003 and observable household characteristics 
such as ethnicity, value of durables and education of household members.
12 Plot registration 
after 2003 is negatively correlated with rice cultivation and positively associated with the 
number of plots and their total size, although these results are not robust and depend on the 
specification.  These  (weak)  relationships  exhibit  intuitive  explanations:  the  more  plots  a 
household has the rights to, the more often the LUC will be (re)issued. Given the time frame 
between the introduction of the land law and the 2008 survey, this weak relation does not 
appear surprising. We minimize the concern about this correlation by including the natural 
logarithm of the total size of operated plots in the set of household controls.
13 Households 
that have cultivated rice in any of the previous three seasons are likely to be constrained in 
their crop choice which indirectly implies that the rights to their plots are recognized by the 
commune  so  that  (re)issuing  the  LUC  may  not  appear  necessary.  We  control  for  rice 
cultivation in our specification to minimize its influence on our identification strategy.
14 
In the main specification we investigate the effects of having registered at least one 
plot on the LUC after 2003 on two different outcome variables: child labor, measured in 
terms of children’s participation in household agricultural production, and years of education 
of children above the age of primary schooling. The econometric specification appears as 
follows: 
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿_￿￿￿￿￿2003￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿_￿￿￿￿￿2003￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿  ￿ !￿￿       (1) 
where  ￿ ￿￿  denotes  one  of  the  two  outcomes  of  interest:  a  binary  variable  measuring 
participation in household production or the duration of education in years of child i in 
household h. ￿￿￿_￿￿￿￿￿2003￿ is the main explanatory variable which takes value 1 if the 
household  has  registered  at  least  one  plot  on  its  land  use  certificate  after  2003  and  0 
otherwise; ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ is a dummy for gender of the child, taking value 1 if the child is female 
and 0 otherwise. In presence of gender equality we would expect the coefficient of ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
to be statistically insignificant both for child labor and for educational attainment as the 
                                                           
12 Results are not shown but available from the authors upon request. 
13 Including the total number of plots does not alter the results.  
14 It should be noted that rice cultivation is not significantly related to either outcome variable of the 
main specification outlined in the following paragraphs. 13 
 
dependent variable. If women have a preference for girls or wish to reduce existing gender 
inequalities, we would expect the increased bargaining power within the household brought 
about by the 2003 Land Law to be reflected in lower child labor and higher educational 
attainment among girls. This means that the estimated marginal effect for girls, which is the 
sum of the coefficients of LUC_after2003 and of the interaction term, would be statistically 
significant,  negative  in  the  specification  for  child  labor  and  positive  in  the  one  for 
educational  attainment.  Stating  a  prior  for  the  marginal  effects  for  boys,  given  by  the 
coefficient of LUC_after2003, is not as straightforward. 
We  control  for  household  characteristics,  ￿￿,        and  children’s  characteristics,  ￿￿￿. 
Regarding household characteristics, we control for gender of the household head, his/her 
age, maximum education among adults within the household, family composition, ethnicity, 
knowledge of the 2003 Land Law, whether rice was cultivated on any of the plots during the 
previous three seasons, whether a member of the household is active in a women’s union and 
whether  the  family  receives  private  transfers.  Furthermore,  we  control  for  the  natural 
logarithms of the value of durable goods
15 and of the total size of operated plots, the distance 
to  the  nearest  primary,  lower  and  upper  secondary  schools.  With  respect  to  individual 
characteristics, we control for age and whether the child is the first-born child. Finally, we 
control for district fixed effects in order to take into account geographical differences.  
4.1  4.1  4.1  4.1 Child labor Child labor Child labor Child labor       
Table  3  reports  the  results  for  participation  in  household  production  as  the 
dependent variable. The findings support our prior of a negative relationship between the 
2003 Land Law and girls’ child labor. Column 1 reports the results of the main specification 
without household controls. Living in a household that is de jure subject to the 2003 Land 
Law does not have any effect on boys’ likelihood of participating in household production, as 
the  estimated coefficient  of  LUC_after2003  is  not  statistically  significant.  The  estimated 
coefficient of the dummy variable Female is positive and statistically significant at the 10% 
level,  which  suggests  that  girls  are  more  likely  to  participate  in  household  agricultural 
production than boys in the absence of the law. The estimated coefficient of the interaction 
term LUC_after2003*Female is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. The 
lower panel of Table 3 reports the marginal effects of being de jure subject to the land law 
                                                           
15 The value of durable goods for all specifications is the total self-estimated value at the time of the 
2008 VARHS for all of the household’s durable goods. These include color TVs, black and white TVs, 
satellite dishes, video or DVD players, stereo systems (CD and radio), radios, cassette players (mono), 
telephones  (including  mobile  phones),  refrigerators,  air  conditioners,  washing  machines,  hot  water 
heaters, motorcycles, bicycles, boats, feed grinding machines, rice milling machines, grain harvesting 
machines, pesticide sprayers, tractors, ploughs, carts, cars and personal computers. 14 
 
for girls, i.e. the sums of the estimated coefficients of LUC_after2003 and the interaction 
term, and the respective F- and p-values of the Wald test. The marginal effects for girls are 
negative and statistically significant for girls’ labor participation rates, indicating that the 
2003 Land Law reduces the likelihood of girls to participate in household production. This 
result supports the idea that the introduction of the land law may have shifted the balance 
of power within the household, giving greater bargaining power to women who in turn want 
to  improve  girls’  outcomes  in  order  to  mitigate  existing  gender  inequalities  among  the 
children in the household. The results hold when household controls are included (column 2) 
and the marginal effects for girls are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The land law, by reaffirming women’s land rights, decreases the probability of girls’ child 
labor by 13.9%.
16 
In the next step we disentangle these effects from the possible endogeneity associated 
with the implementation of the 2003 Land Law at the household level. We exclude from the 
sample households that have registered at least one plot after the introduction of the 2003 
Land Law and whose land use certificates bear both spouses’ names. Put differently, we test 
for the effects of being subject to the 2003 Land Law on children’s outcomes in the absence 
of  law  implementation  at  the  household  level.  Implementation  of  the  land  law  requires 
knowledge of the law as well as the willingness to explicitly request its application. Reducing 
the sample does not alter the results (column 3). 
                                                           
16 Results from Probit estimation performed on separate regressions for boys and girls support the 




A  potential  concern  is  that  our  findings  for  child  labor  may  be  driven  by  plot 
acquisition  rather  than  by  plot  registration  under  the  2003  Land  Law.  We  introduce  a 
modified measure of being de jure subject to the land law to the specification presented in 
equation 1. The dummy variable LUC_after2003_Reg takes value 1 if the household has 
registered a plot after 2003 and has not acquired additional plots over that period and 0 
otherwise. This variation in the definition of being de jure subject to the 2003 Land Law is a 
first attempt to disentangle the effects of plot acquisition from those of plot registration 
under the law. We will return to this issue in more detail in Section 5. The results presented 
in the last three columns of Table 3 confirm our previous findings. The land law decreases 
the probability of girls being involved in child labor but does not impact on boys’ work 
participation  rates,  when  excluding  and  including  household  controls  (columns  4  and  5, 
respectively) and for the reduced sample (column 6).  
Table 3: Child  Table 3: Child  Table 3: Child  Table 3: Child labor labor labor labor— — — —       Children 6 Children 6 Children 6 Children 6- - - -14 years of age. 14 years of age. 14 years of age. 14 years of age.   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  Participation in household agricultural production 
             
LUC_after2003  0.00393  -0.0101  -0.00230       
  [0.0589]  [0.0568]  [0.0779]       




**       
  [0.056]  [0.0506]  [0.0651]       




*  0.0388  0.0380  0.0418 
  [0.0279]  [0.0264]  [0.0268]  [0.0264]  [0.0249]  [0.0261] 
             
LUC_after2003_Reg        -0.0286  -0.0199  0.0282 
        [0.0564]  [0.0579]  [0.0818] 
             




        [0.0673]  [0.0664]  [0.0857] 
             
             
Household controls  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Individual controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
District fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
Marginal effects for girls  -0.1208  -0.1386  -0.1655  -0.1730  -0.1871  -0.2053 
F-value  5.93  7.08  5.50  6.18  8.24  6.69 
P-value  0.0163  0.0088  0.0206  0.0142  0.0048  0.0109 
             












             
Observations  1030  1030  966  1030  1030  966 
R-squared  0.117  0.193  0.197  0.119  0.194  0.198 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  




4. 4. 4. 4.2 2 2 2       Educational attainment Educational attainment Educational attainment Educational attainment       
In  this  section  we  present  results  for  educational  attainment  as  the  dependent 
variable for the sample of children between the ages of 11 and 18 years not living with a 
single  parent  as  the  household  head.  We  report  the  regression  results  in  Table  4,  the 
marginal effects for girls are given in the lower panel.  
Columns 1 and 2 present the results of the main specification as outlined in equation 
1, when excluding and including household controls. The 2003 Land Law does not have any 
effect on the duration of education for boys and in the absence of the land law the duration 
of education is not significantly different between boys and girls, although the estimated 
coefficient  of  Female  is  negative.  The  2003  Land  Law  does  not  have  any  statistically 
significant impact on educational attainment for girls when household controls are excluded 
from the specification (column 1) but becomes statistically significant at the 10% level once 
household controls are included (column 2). The effect is positive and ranges between an 
additional 1.28 and 1.82 years of education as reported in columns 1 and 2.  
 
Table 4: Educational  Table 4: Educational  Table 4: Educational  Table 4: Educational attainment attainment attainment attainment— — — —       Children 11 Children 11 Children 11 Children 11- - - -18 years of age. 18 years of age. 18 years of age. 18 years of age.   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  Educational attainment 
             
LUC_after2003  0.0606  0.373  0.245       
  [0.681]  [0.791]  [0.887]       
             
LUC_after2003*Female  1.221  1.443  3.560
***       
  [0.888]  [0.939]  [1.249]       
             
Female  -0.542  -0.429  -0.483  -0.536  -0.429  -0.432 
  [0.476]  [0.454]  [0.450]  [0.462]  [0.442]  [0.445] 
             
LUC_after2003_Reg        -0.410  -0.242  -0.297 
        [0.699]  [0.992]  [1.350] 
             
LUC_after2003_Reg*Female        1.823  2.393
*  3.810
** 
        [1.191]  [1.222]  [1.693] 
             
             
Household controls  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Individual controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
District fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
Marginal effects for girls  1.2820  1.8154  3.8046  1.4130  2.1511  3.5135 
F-value  1.84  3.05  6.72  1.34  3.02  3.39 
P-value  0.1788  0.0840  0.0111  0.2507  0.0854  0.0686 
             












             
Observations  361  361  348  361  361  348 
R-squared  0.122  0.239  0.262  0.122  0.239  0.253 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  




In column 3 we restrict the sample in the same fashion as in Table 3, i.e. we exclude 
households that have registered at least one plot after 2003 and whose LUC reports both 
spouses’ names. The estimated coefficient of the interaction term LUC_after2003*Female is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Overall, the effect of the 2003 Land Law 
on girls’ educational attainment is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level.  
The findings are robust to considering the alternative measure LUC_after2003_Reg 
explained  in  the  previous  section.  The  results  hold  for  the  full  sample  when  including 
household  controls  (columns  5)  and  for  the  reduced  sample  (column  6).  Similar  to  the 
findings for child work, the land law appears to positively affect girls’ outcomes while no 
impact is found for boys.  
5. Robustness checks 5. Robustness checks 5. Robustness checks 5. Robustness checks       
We conduct three types of robustness checks. First, given that the 2003 Land Law 
reinforces equal rights for both spouses on each plot acquired during marriage, we restrict 
the sample to couples who were married before registering at least one plot under the 2003 
Land Law. Second, we disentangle the effects of plot acquisition from the effects of plot 
registration under the 2003 Land Law. Finally, we examine the effects of plot registration on 
children’s outcomes in the absence of the 2003 Land Law. The robustness checks confirm the 
main findings and exclude possible concurrent factors: the reduction in girls’ child labor and 
the increase in educational attainment for girls are indeed triggered by the 2003 Land Law.  
 
5.1 Restricted sample 5.1 Restricted sample 5.1 Restricted sample 5.1 Restricted sample       
In the analysis presented in Section 4 we have focused on the effects of the 2003 Land 
Law on children not living with a single parent as the household head and have assumed 
that  the  household  head  was  married  prior  to  registering  the  latest  acquired  plot.  This 
assumption  is  reasonable  considering  that  out  of  wedlock  childbearing  is  uncommon  in 
Vietnam (Friedman et al. 2003) and that the youngest children included in our sample were 
born  in  2002,  i.e.  before  the  introduction  of  the  Land  Law.
17  The  Vietnam  Access  to 
Resources  Household  Survey  (VARHS)  as  well  as  the  Vietnamese  Household  Living 
Standards Survey (VHLSS) contain information regarding current marital status, but not 
about the date of change in marital status. Given the overlap between the samples of the 
VHLSS and the VARHS, we combine the information contained in the 2004 VHLSS and the 
2006 and 2008 VARHS to restrict the sample to children living in households whose head 
                                                           
17 According to the 2000 Marriage and Family Law any plot acquired during marriage is considered 
jointly owned by the spouses (The National Assembly of The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam 2000). 18 
 
was married before having registered at least one plot on the land use certificate.
18 By doing 
so, we adopt a conservative approach and exclude children living in a household that is not 
(with  certainty)  subject  to  the  2003  Land  Law  because  of  (the  possibility  of)  private 
ownership of all plots by one spouse.  
Columns  1  and  2  of  Table  5  report  the  estimation  results  for  participation  in 
household  production  as  the  dependent  variable  following  the  specification  outlined  in 
equation 1. In line with our previous findings, being de jure subject to the 2003 Land Law 
reduces  the likelihood  of  girls  participating  in household  production.  The  lower  panel  of 
Table 5 presents the marginal effects for girls: the negative effect of the 2003 Land Law on 
girls’  work  rates  is  statistically  significant  at  the  5%  level  when  household  controls  are 
excluded (column 1) and at the 1% level when household controls are included (column 2). 
We do not find any statistically significant effects for boys or for gender inequality among 
children with respect to participation in household production. 
 
                                                           
18 We restrict the 2008 VARHS sample  to include households whose heads  were married in 2004 
according to the 2004 VHLSS and registered a plot after 2004 and households whose heads were 
married in 2006 according to the 2006 VARHS and registered a plot after 2006. It is not possible to 
establish the sequence of events for all households due to the limited information regarding marital 
status which results in a loss of observations beyond the one intended by the restriction criteria. 
Table 5: Child  Table 5: Child  Table 5: Child  Table 5: Child l l l labor and  abor and  abor and  abor and e e e educational  ducational  ducational  ducational a a a attainment ttainment ttainment ttainment— — — —       Restricted  Restricted  Restricted  Restricted sample sample sample sample       
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  Child labour  Educational 
attainment 
         
LUC_after2003  -0.0860  -0.109  0.523  -0.405 
  [0.107]  [0.103]  [0.898]  [0.878] 




*  1.347 
  [0.076]  [0.0766]  [1.171]  [0.947] 
         
Female  0.0307  0.0478  -1.603
**  -0.925 
  [0.0454]  [0.0510]  [0.616]  [0.829] 
         
         
Household controls  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Individual controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
District fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Marginal effects for girls  -0.2404  -0.2998  2.5362  0.9425 
F-value  6.18  9.15  3.73  1.46 
P-value  0.0147  0.0032  0.0593  0.2325 
         
Sample  Age 6-14  Age 11-18 
         
Observations  383  383  112  112 
R-squared  0.112  0.226  0.191  0.491 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  




Columns 3 and 4 report the results for the duration of education in years as the 
dependent variable and the marginal effects for girls are presented in the lower panel. We do 
not find an effect of the land law on boys’ duration of education but the results indicate a 
negative  and  statistically  significant  effect  of  being  female  when  household  controls  are 
excluded (column 3). The marginal effects of the 2003 Land Law for girls are reported in the 
lower panel: the land law appears to have a positive and statistically significant impact on 
girls’  educational  attainment,  although  this effect  becomes  statistically insignificant  when 
household  controls  are  included  in  the  specification  (column  4).  The  drastically  reduced 
sample size may be an explanation for these less robust results.  
5.2 Plot acquisition as the driving factor? 5.2 Plot acquisition as the driving factor? 5.2 Plot acquisition as the driving factor? 5.2 Plot acquisition as the driving factor?       
Bar and Basu (2009) and Basu et al. (2010) show, both theoretically and empirically, 
that the relationship between child labor and plot acquisition exhibits an inverted U-shape. 
As a next step in our robustness checks, we disentangle the effects of the 2003 Land Law 
from the effects of plot acquisition. We introduce the variable "￿#￿_￿￿￿￿￿2003￿, which takes 
value 1 if the household has acquired a plot after 2003, and 0 otherwise. The rationale for 
this exercise is to ensure that the findings of Section 4 are the result of the 2003 Land Law 
and  are  not  driven  by  the  acquisition  of  an  additional  plot.  We  amend  equation  1  by 
replacing LUC_after2003 with plot_after2003:  
 
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿"￿#￿_￿￿￿￿￿2003￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿"￿#￿_￿￿￿￿￿2003￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿  ￿ !￿￿         (2) 
where  the  specification  is  identical  to  equation  1,  apart  from  the  new  variable 
"￿#￿_￿￿￿￿￿2003￿. If plot acquisition is not the driving factor of the reduced girls’ labor and 
increased  educational  attainment,  the  estimated  marginal  effects  for  girls  should  not  be 
statistically significant. The restrictions of the sample are identical to the main specification 
of Section 4 which results in identical sample sizes for the two dependent variables. Table 6 
reports  the  results  of  this  exercise.  None  of  the  estimated  coefficients  are  statistically 
significant for participation in household production for both boys and girls which indicates 
that there is no statistically significant impact of land acquisition on children’s participation 
in  household  production,  excluding  or  including  household  controls  (columns  1  and  2, 
respectively).  20 
 
 
Columns 3 and 4 present the estimation results for educational attainment as the 
dependent  variable.  We  find  a  statistically  significant  effect  of  plot  acquisition  on  the 
duration of boys’ education. The acquisition of at least one additional plot after 2003 is 
positively related to boys’ educational attainment, which may be the result of a wealth or 
income effect. The estimated coefficient of the interaction term plot_after2003 *Female is 
negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. However, none of the marginal effects 
for girls is statistically significant; we can therefore conclude that plot acquisition is not the 
driving force behind the effects of the 2003 Land Law on girls’ outcomes found in the main 
specification presented in Section 4.  
 
5.3 Plot registration as the driving factor? 5.3 Plot registration as the driving factor? 5.3 Plot registration as the driving factor? 5.3 Plot registration as the driving factor? 
In  order  to  isolate  the  effects  of  the  2003  Land  Law  from  the  effects  of  plot 
registration, we take advantage of the panel structure of the VARHS and employ the data of 
the round of the survey conducted in 2006. We use the econometric specification presented 
in equation 1 and go back by two years in every respect, i.e. for the data set as well as for 
the definition of the main explanatory variable. The idea is to isolate the impact of the land 
law on children’s outcomes by considering the effect of land use certificates issued after 2001, 
Table 6: Child  Table 6: Child  Table 6: Child  Table 6: Child l l l labor and  abor and  abor and  abor and e e e educational  ducational  ducational  ducational a a a attainment  ttainment  ttainment  ttainment — — — —       Plot  Plot  Plot  Plot a a a acquisition  cquisition  cquisition  cquisition        
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  Child labour  Educational 
attainment 
         
Plot_after2003  0.0202  -0.00624  1.281
*  1.174
** 
  [0.0558]  [0.0525]  [0.682]  [0.589] 
         
Plot_after2003*Female  -0.014  -0.00628  -1.827
**  -1.960
** 
  [0.065]  [0.0646]  [0.837]  [0.860] 
         
Female  0.0271  0.0230  0.0520  0.205 
  [0.0289]  [0.0276]  [0.517]  [0.525] 
         
         
Household controls  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Individual controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
District fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Marginal effects for girls  0.0058  -0.0125  -0.5460  -0.7860 
F-value  0.02  0.09  0.54  1.28 
P-value  0.8985  0.7689  0.4655  0.2603 
         
Sample  Age 6-14  Age 11-18 
         
Observations  1030  1030  361  361 
R-squared  0.111  0.186  0.136  0.248 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  




instead of land use certificates issued after 2003. The new variable LUC_after2001 takes 
value 1 if at least one plot was registered after 2001 and before 2004, i.e. before the 2003 
Land Law effectively came into effect, and 0 otherwise. If the effect observed on children’s 
outcomes is indeed related to the introduction of the 2003 Land Law, we should not observe 
any  statistically  significant  impact  of  the  variable  LUC_after2001  on  child  labor  and 
children’s educational attainment among girls.  
For neither boys nor girls the marginal effects of registering a plot after 2001 and 
before 2004 are statistically significant as shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7, which rules 
out that the effects found for girls in Section 4 are driven by the mere registration of a plot 
rather than by registration under the 2003 Land Law. The results are robust to the inclusion 
of household controls (column 2). 
 
Columns  3  and  4  present  the  same  specification  for  duration  of  education  as  the 
dependent  variable,  excluding  and  including  household  controls,  respectively.  As  the 
estimated  coefficient  of  LUC_after2001  is  statistically  significant,  registration  of  an 
additional plot after 2001 and before 2004 has a positive effect on the duration of education 
for  boys  which  may  be  driven  by  the  increased  security  regarding  the  household’s  land 
rights. The estimated coefficient of the interaction term LUC_after2001 *Female is negative 
and statistically significant at the 10% level. However, none of the marginal effects for girls 
Table 7: Child  Table 7: Child  Table 7: Child  Table 7: Child l l l labor and  abor and  abor and  abor and e e e educational  ducational  ducational  ducational a a a attainment ttainment ttainment ttainment— — — —       Plot  Plot  Plot  Plot r r r registration  egistration  egistration  egistration        
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  Child labour  Educational 
attainment 
         
LUC_after2001  0.0549  0.0725  1.590
***  1.454
*** 
  [0.0611]  [0.0549]  [0.368]  [0.473] 
         




  [0.079]  [0.0776]  [0.653]  [0.698] 
         
Female  0.00741  0.00711  -0.00864  0.00468 
  [0.0283]  [0.0281]  [0.235]  [0.221] 
         
         
Household controls  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Individual controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
District fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Marginal effects for girls  -0.0486  -0.0684  0.4866  0.2241 
F-value  0.89  1.38  0.67  0.16 
P-value  0.3485  0.2423  0.4140  0.6928 
         
Sample  Age 6-14  Age 11-18 
         
Observations  1751  1751  1186  1186 
R-squared  0.179  0.221  0.210  0.303 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  




are statistically significant, thus ruling out that the effects on girls’ educational attainment 
presented in Section 4 are due to mere plot registration.  
 
6. Conclusions 6. Conclusions 6. Conclusions 6. Conclusions       
A growing strand of literature on household economics has analyzed the impact of 
the gender of income recipients on children’s outcomes. Departing from this literature, we 
study  how  reinforcing  women’s  land  titling  affects  child  labor  and  children’s  educational 
attainment. On the basis of a quasi-natural experiment offered by a recent Vietnamese land 
law and with the help of a household survey data set, we demonstrate empirically that the 
introduction of laws strengthening equal land rights of both the household head and his 
spouse has positive effects on the outcomes of girls living in households that are de jure 
subject to this law.  
We provide robust evidence in favor of a negative association between legal exposure 
to the land law and girls’ likelihood of participating in household production. We also find 
some  evidence  for  a  positive  impact  of  the  law  on  girls’  educational  attainment  of 
considerable magnitude. The 2003 Land Law decreases the probability of girls’ child labor by 
13.9% and increases girls’ education by 1.82 years according to our main results.  
We do not find comparable effects for boys. In the absence of the law, girls are found 
to  be  more  likely  to  play  an  active  role  in  household  agricultural  production  while  no 
evidence is found for gender inequality with respect to educational attainment. It therefore 
appears that the increased bargaining power of women brought about by the 2003 Land Law 
can at least partly mitigate existing gender inequalities in work rates among children and 
may translate to educational attainment for girls only.  
The robustness checks support the main findings: the effects found for girls can be 
attributed to the 2003 Land Law, ruling out other concurrent driving factors. In particular, 
we use a sub-sample of children living in households that are with certainty part of the 
population targeted by the 2003 Land Law in order to exclude private ownership by one 
spouse only. Furthermore, we ensure that neither the acquisition nor the mere registration of 
an additional plot acts as the driving factor instead of land registration under the law. By 
employing  a  previous  round  of  the  survey,  we  are  able  to  study  the  impact  of  plot 
registration on children’s outcomes before the introduction of the 2003 Land Law. 
According to our findings, the introduction of laws aiming to strengthen the woman’s 
position within the household by reinforcing equal land use rights positively impacts on the 
outcomes of girls by changing customary rules.  23 
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